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The Arab economies present a unique opportunity to test the tax model of capital 
structure.  These economies may be dichotomized into taxable and non-taxable states.  
The results support a number of implications of the tax-based theories of capital structure.  
We document relatively higher leverage in economies that impose a corporate income 
tax.  We also document that leverage is significantly positive in the proxy for corporate 
marginal  tax  rate.    In  addition,  we  find  that  non-debt  tax  shield  is  a  positive  and 
significant determinant of capital structure in non-taxed economies, but is insignificant in 
taxed economies.  Additionally, we find that leverage is systematically related to size, 
collateral, and profitability.  The overall results are suggestive of the portability of capital 
structure theory(ies) across diverse economies.  
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The Role of Taxes in Capital Structure:  Evidence from Taxed and Non-Taxed Arab 
Economies 
 
1.  Introduction 
One of the enduring theories of capital structure is the static trade-off (STO) model 
of capital structure, which can be traced to the works of Modigliani and Miller (MM) 
(1958, 1963). The hallmark of the STO model is that debt structure choice depends on the 
relative benefits and costs of debt.  As pointed out by MM, a primary benefit of debt is 
the tax shield effect while on the cost side bankruptcy (among other things) may act as a 
significant  countervailing force.   Since the MM  studies,  research on  capital  structure 
theory  has  been refined to  include the effects  of non-debt  tax shield,  personal  taxes, 
agency costs, asymmetric information costs, input/product market factors and others. 
Although debt tax shield plays such a central role in the STO model, there are few 
studies that examine explicitly the effects of corporate tax on the capital structure choice 
(a point noted by Stewart Myers in his presidential address to the American Finance 
Association (Myers (1984)).  One problem is that the research is largely cross-sectional in 
nature and unless there is significant cross-sectional variation in marginal tax rates, the 
effect of taxes on capital structure choice would be difficult to detect.  Consequently most 
studies that model the cross-sectional behavior of debt structure do not even include an 
explicit measure of the tax effect (e.g., Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), and Titman and 
Wessels  (1988)).   A  second  problem  is  that  even  in  the  few  studies  that  attempt  to 
calculate the marginal tax rate, trying to back out the marginal tax rate from accounting 
data can be a daunting exercise (e.g., Graham (1996)). Finally, some studies examine 
changes in debt structure following tax law changes, but these are beset with problems 
associated with adequately controlling for other macro-economic effects that may have a 
bearing on the debt structure choice decision and problems with the stickiness of leverage 
over time. 
In this paper we are presented with a unique opportunity to test the tax models of 
capital structure theory using data from the Arab world.  The Arab states as a group are 
distinctive in that some of the states levy corporate taxes while others do not, permitting  
2   
 
us to test the differential impact of taxes on capital structure choice.  This paper is also 
unique in that it is one of few studies to tackle the issue of capital structure determinants 
outside the US, especially among developing countries.  Notable exceptions are Booth et 
al.  (2001)  who  study  capital  structure  determinants  in  a  sample  of  10  developing 
countries and Rajan and Zingales (1995) who examine the same issue among the G-7 
nations.  Investigations into capital structure determinants across a variety of countries 
should  provide  evidence  on  the  universality  of  capital  structure  theories  developed 
primarily in the US.  As noted by Booth et al., the test of capital structure portability 
should be ―especially severe‖ if the environments being considered are characterized by 
institutional, cultural, and economic factors that are significantly different from those in 
the West.  Given the very unique nature of Arab economies on these dimensions, an 
examination  of  capital  structure  determinants  in  Arab  countries  should  be  especially 
valuable in yielding insights into the portability of capital structure theories developed in 
the West.       
The sample of economies for the study is drawn from the Arab League.  We focus 
on the countries in the Arab League as this allows for some measure of homogeneity 
including many institutional aspects and commonality of cultural mores.
1 Of the 22 Arab 
states in the Arab League, only the 12 states that have stock markets are included in the 
study: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon.  While relatively homogeneous from a 
cultural perspective, these economies represent a diverse group in terms of a number of 
economic characteristics including tax structure, economic development, stock market, 
and debt activity as revealed in Table 1.  The statistics shown are for the year 2001, which 
is  the  latest  year  of  the  sample  period  included  in  the  study.    From  a  corporate  tax 
perspective these economies can be divided into two main groups: the economies that do 
not levy taxes—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates—and 
the remaining tax levying economies.
2 The treatment of personal taxes on interest mirrors 
                                                        
1 The Arab League was formed in 1945 to strengthen relations among the member Arab states, improve 
coordination, safeguard independence and sovereignty and otherwise protect the interests of Arab countries 
(www.arableagueonline.org). 
2 The astute observer will note that the non-tax levying countries are also the ―wealthier‖ economies.  In 
our robustness tests (discussed later) we control for the wealth differential between the economies and find 
that our main results are robust to any wealth effect that might affect corporate capital structure choice.    
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that of the corporate tax treatment, i.e., economies that levy taxes on corporate income 
also levy taxes on personal interest income (with the exception of Oman where personal 
interest income is not taxed but corporate income is, albeit at a low rate of 0-7.5 percent).  
Dividends are generally not taxed at the personal level regardless of whether corporate 
income is taxed, with two exceptions—Lebanon and Jordan, both corporate tax levying 
countries that tax dividends at 5% and 10%, respectively.  Capital gains are not taxed in 
any of the 12 Arab states included in the study.   
The Arab states included in the study are characterized by considerable diversity in 
terms of their economic characteristics including the development of capital markets. The 
gross domestic product (GDP) varies from a low of US$ 4 billion in Palestine to a high of 
US$ 186.5 billion in Saudi Arabia.  Per capita income varies from a modest US$ 1,146 in 
Morocco to a high of US$ 28,140 in Qatar. The number of listed companies varies from 
14 in Lebanon to 1,110 in Egypt.  Market capitalization of equity ranges from US$ 743 
million in Palestine to US$ 154 billion in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The market 
capitalization percent to GDP varies from 7.5% for Lebanon to 228% for the UAE.  The 
surprisingly high percentage for the UAE is a reflection of the preeminence of its stock 
exchange  as  a  regional  exchange  with  listings  from  domestic  as  well  as  numerous 
companies from the broader Middle Eastern region.  The liquidity of the exchanges as 
captured by the percentage of trading volume to market capitalization shows that Kuwait 
is  the  most  liquid  at  44%  while  the  least  liquid  is  Bahrain  with  trading  volume 
representing only 4% of its market capitalization.  Despite the fact that Arab economies 
are  closely  associated  with  Islamic  banking,  private  bank  lending  is  not  uncommon.  
Bank credit as a percent of GDP varies between 24% in Palestine to as high as 202% in 
Lebanon.        
The primary focus of our paper is on the role of taxes in explaining capital structure 
preference with emphasis on corporate taxes.  To this end, we regress six leverage ratios 
(short term, long term, and total book values of debt over both book and market values of 
equity) on empirical and theory suggested determinants of capital structure widely used 
in prior literature. 
This paper finds support for tax-based models of capital structure; thus, tax models 
of capital structure are robust and portable across countries regardless of country specific  
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factors. The notable findings of the paper include:  
(1)  Companies operating in regimes that levy corporate income taxes use more debt 
than those in regimes devoid of corporate income taxes. 
(2)  Corporate marginal tax rate is a significantly positive determinant of financial 
leverage. 
(3)   Non-debt  tax  shield  (depreciation  and  investment  tax  credit)  is  significantly 
positively related to firm leverage in non-taxed economies supporting the notion 
that non-debt tax shield, as measured, is proxying for the collateral value of 
assets and  its positive impact on leverage. On the other hand we document that 
non-debt tax shield is not significant in taxed economies consistent with the 
view that our measure of non-debt tax shield is picking up the collateral and 
substitution effects in these regimes.  
(4)    Personal taxes do not appear to impact firm leverage. 
In addition, we find that leverage is systematically related to size, collateral, and 
profitability similar to that documented in a number of prior US and international studies.  
In supplementary tests we find that for Arab firms leverage and family ownership are 
positively related but we do not find evidence that government ownership is a significant 
determinant of corporate debt.  The overall results are indicative of the portability of 
capital structure theories across economies with very diverse institutional backgrounds.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a very brief review 
of relevant literature. Section 3 presents an overview of the institutional background of 
Arab economies with respect to taxes, and sources and characteristics of debt.  Section 4 
develops the hypotheses and variable descriptions. Section 5 describes the sample source, 
data,  and  the  methodology  used.  Section  6  details  the  empirical  results.  Section  7 
provides a brief summary and highlights the contributions of this study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on capital structure is rather voluminous and extensive.  Since the 
focus of our paper is on the role of tax-based aspects of debt choice, we review related 
theoretical and empirical evidence.  Even within this space we confine our survey to 
selected articles that in our opinion are especially relevant.  
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MM (1963) are the first to rigorously demonstrate the role of the tax benefit of debt.  
Given perfect market assumptions and the presence of corporate taxes, MM show that the 
value of the firm increases by an amount equivalent to the debt tax shield, i.e., present 
value of the future tax shield benefits.  Miller (1977) incorporates the role of personal 
taxes into the capital structure issue.  Under certain assumptions, Miller concludes that 
whatever tax gains accrue from issuing debt at the corporate level will be exhausted at the 
personal tax level and that the value of the firm, in equilibrium, is independent of its 
capital structure as originally conceived in MM (1958).  Specifically, Miller demonstrates 
that if (a) the capital gains provisions or other special relief effectively eliminates the 
personal tax on equity income, (b) full loss offsets are available at the corporate level and 
(c) the marginal personal tax rate on interest income just equals the marginal corporate 
rate, then the tax shield gains from corporate leverage vanish entirely. That is, the gains 
from interest deductibility at the corporate level are exactly offset by the added burden of 
interest includability under the personal tax.  
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) consider the effects of non-debt sources of tax shield.  
In their model the tax shield benefit of debt kicks in only after other sources of tax shield 
benefits are exhausted, i.e., depreciation, losses, and investment tax credit.  Thus, in the 
DeAngelo and Masulis framework the tax shield benefit of debt is moderated by the 
presence of non-debt tax shield benefits.    
We now turn to empirical evidence with respect to the various tax-related aspects of 
corporate debt choice.  As noted previously there are few empirical investigations that 
may be considered to be direct tests of the tax shield model of debt.  Givoly, et al. (1992) 
test the effect of the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 on the change in leverage in US 
firms. They test leverage around the enactment of the TRA and find support for tax-based 
theories of capital structure. Specifically, the propensity of firms to decrease leverage as a 
result of a drop in the statutory tax rate is greater with a higher effective tax rate.  
Graham (1996) calculates and uses the marginal tax rate (MTR) (the present value 
of current and future taxes paid on an additional dollar of income earned today) instead of 
just the average of past paid taxes as used in Givoly, et al. (1992) to test its impact on 
capital structure choice.  He uses data on US firms to regress changes in debt on MTR, 
σMTR, STR (the statutory tax rate) minus MTR, plus a number of control variables. He  
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finds that the coefficient for MTR confirms a positive relationship between debt use and 
the marginal tax rate. Also, he finds that firms with STR > (<) MTR will issue more 
(less) debt and firms with large σMTR will have a large expected tax bill and therefore 
will issue more debt.  
Singh  and  Hamid  (1992)  use  data  from  9  developing  countries  from  various 
locations around the world; they find that differences in the magnitudes and signs of the 
determinants of capital structure among countries are due to differences in tax, legal, and 
other  institutional  factors  (accounting  practices,  degree  of  development  of  financial 
markets, etc.). Their evidence renders some indirect support to the tax model of capital 
structure theory. 
Booth,  et  al.  (2001)  assess  whether  capital  structure  theory  is  portable  across 
countries with different institutional structures. They find that—across countries—debt 
ratios are negatively related to tax rates.  They attribute this seemingly odd finding to the 
possibility  that  the  average  tax  rate  measure  used  in  their  study  is  proxying  for 
profitability (i.e., higher the average tax rate higher the profitability) rather than the debt 
tax shield potential.  Antoniou, et al. (2002) use panel data from Britain, France, and 
Germany but find mixed results (amongst countries) for the tax rate variable and other 
factors.    These  mixed  results,  they  argue,  show  that  institutional  arrangements  and 
country traditions contribute to capital structure decisions. 
Empirical tests of the non-debt tax shield (NDTS) effect on debt policy are mixed.  
A few (e.g. Givoly, et al. 1992, Graham 1996) find a negative relationship between the 
firm’s level of debt and the amount of NDTS supporting DeAngelo and Masulis’ (1980) 
substitutability hypothesis.  Others (e.g. Bradley, et al. (1984) and Bathala, et al. (1994)) 
find a positive relationship between the firm’s level of debt and the amount of NDTS.  A 
positive relationship contradicts the traditional substitutability argument between debt tax 
shield and NDTS.  The positive relationship is argued away by suggesting that NDTS is 
an instrumental variable for debt collateral, i.e., NDTS is picking up the collateral effect 
of debt—higher the NDTS, higher the collateral value of assets.  
With regard to the effect of personal taxes, only a limited number of studies were 
encountered in our review of the literature. Givoly, et al. (1992) find that personal taxes  
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have a negative effect on the firm’s leverage while Graham (1996) observes that the 
relative taxation of debt and equity at the personal level has no effect on debt.  
 
3.  Institutional Aspects of the Arab World 
In this section we provide a brief discussion of two institutional aspects of the Arab 
world—the tax system and the debt market.  Since taxes are a central aspect of the study, 
it is important to understand the dichotomy of the Arab economies into tax and non-tax 
countries.  Discussing the nature of the debt market in Arab economies also is important 
for  two  reasons:    first,  there  is  the  popular  misconception  that  because  interest  is 
considered taboo in Arab countries no debt is used in corporate and personal financing 
and, second, there are significant differences between how debt is structured and obtained 
in the Arab countries compared to the Western economies.   
 
a. Tax Regimes in Arab Countries 
Tax laws in Arab economies for the most part are derived from the laws of the 
respective colonizing countries (Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the 
Gulf  states  were  colonized  by  England,  while  Tunisia,  Morocco  and  Lebanon  were 
colonized  by  France)  (Alsafarini  (1988)).  These  laws  are  usually  well  written, 
comprehensive and updated quite often.  Table 1 shows both corporate and personal tax 
rates for the Arab economies considered in this paper along with other aggregate level 
data.
3   
As noted earlier, Arab economies may be divided into two groups: economies that 
impose taxes (tax countries) and economies that do not levy taxes (non -tax countries).  
The no tax economies include the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar while 
the remaining economies fall into the tax group.  The tax classifications are based on the 
tax  rates  for  corporations  domiciled  in  the  country  and  majority  owned  by  local 
investors.
4 
                                                        
3 A common aspect of the taxed Arab countries, not evident from Table 1, is that loss carry backs are not 
permitted.   
4  This  qualification  is  important  because  foreign  owned  corporations  are  usually  taxed  at  different 
(typically, higher) rates.  One other qualification relevant to this study is  that in the non-tax Arab states 
certain sectors may be taxed—usually oil related.  For example, Bahrain (classified as a non-tax economy)  
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The division of the Arab economies into two tax groups is very important because 
of its implication for the determinants of leverage. Other factors being equal (e.g., risk, 
bankruptcy, liquidity, maturity, agency and information asymmetry costs), there should 
not be a relative preference for debt or equity in the non-taxed economies.  However, for 
taxed economies the story is much different.  The relative attractiveness of the securities 
should be based on similar considerations as in most Western economies. However, one 
aspect that may distinguish taxed Arab economies from Western economies, especially 
the US, is that dividends are either not taxed or taxed at a lower level than interest (See 
Table 1). For this reason, investors in taxed Arab regimes will require a comparatively 
higher return on debt to compensate them for the personal tax disadvantage, and this will 
eat  up  the  corporate  tax  advantage  of  debt.   To  make  matters  worse,  it  is  generally 
acknowledged that in the Arab world investing in corporate securities is largely confined 
to those in high tax brackets.  The personal tax disadvantage of debt could make debt 
relatively more expensive to firms than equity.  From this discussion it is evident the 
presence or absence of corporate taxes and the relative treatment of personal taxes on 
interest and dividends may have a bearing on corporate capital structure choice in Arab 
economies.  
 
b. Debt Markets in the Arab World 
One  of  the  distinguishing  aspects  of Arab  economies  is  a  strong  resistance  to 
interest-based finance. This resentment stems from the prohibition of interest rates in 
Islam.  For example, the Quran states: Those who devour usury will not stand except as 
stands one whom the devil by his touch has driven to madness…. Trade is like usury but 
Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury.... Allah will deprive usury of all blessing, 
but will give increase for deeds of charity, for He loves not any ungrateful sinner.... O you 
who believe, fear Allah and give up what remains of your demand for usury, if you are 
indeed believers. [Surah al Baqarah, verse 275-280].  As a result of this admonition, Arab 
economies have developed an alternative to the conventional interest-based economy in 
general  and  to  conventional  banking  and  financial  instruments  in  particular.    This 
                                                                                                                                                                     
taxes oil companies at 45% but other corporations (unless foreign owned) are not taxed on their income.  
We exclude such firms and industries from our sample.    
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alternative  financial  system  has  come  to  be  known  as  ―Islamic  finance‖  or  ―Islamic 
banking.‖  
The underlying principle of Islamic banks and other Islamic financial institutions 
can be summarized as follows: there can be no riba (interest) charged on any transaction 
or  service,  as  interest  is  considered  usury  and  is  condemned  by  the  Quran.  Riba  is 
prohibited on the principle of ―no pain no gain.‖  Interest is replaced by a share-out key 
determined  beforehand  wherein  a  share  of  risks  and  profits  is  allocated  between  the 
borrower, the bank, and the owner of the productive capital.  This suggests that Islamic 
banking  involves  risks  similar  to  venture  capital  finance  or  an  equity  investment.  
However, there are many different types of transactions that are permissible under the 
strictures of Islamic banking.   Islamic banks submit all new types of transactions to a 
"Sharia  (Islamic  law)  committee"  in  order  to  check  their  conformity  with  Islamic 
principles.  Edwardes  (2000)  notes  that  95  per  cent  of  Islamic  banking  as  practiced 
involves some form of pre-determination of profit or "mark-up" which is acceptable to 
Sharia since it is regarded as ―capital gains‖ and not ―interest.‖ 
While Islamic banking is a distinguishing feature of Arab financing practice, several 
observations are relevant with regard to our research:  (1) Most of the Islamic banking 
transactions are at the individual level.   For example, in a study commissioned by Al 
Ahli bank of Saudi Arabia in 2002 it was reported that 95% of Islamic banking practice 
was confined to business done with individuals to buy durable goods. The remaining 5% 
was in the form of long and short-term loans to small businesses.  Since the companies in 
this paper’s sample are the largest in their respective countries, their debt for the most 
part is not affected by the no-interest strictures of Islamic banking.  Even in the case of 
firms that may have Islamic debt, as noted in Edwardes (2000), the predetermined mark-
up in lieu of interest is considered a form of interest bearing debt.  (2) From a financial 
statement reporting perspective, no distinction is made between the two types of debt.  (3) 
In taxed economies interest in the form of a ―mark-up‖ is considered tax deductible.
5    
While banking practices in Arab countries may not conform to the Western world in 
some aspects, the Arab banking systems are quite advanced and capable of assuming their 
                                                        
5 For example, Palestine Telecom has Islamic debt on its balance sheet and reports the ―mark-up‖ as a tax 
deductible expense.    
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role  in  furnishing  ―loans‖  needed  to  fulfill  the  external  capital  requirements  of Arab 
public enterprises.  Arab banks’ ability to both underwrite corporate securities and to own 
equity adds to their importance in corporate financing decisions. Another measure of the 
importance of the banking sector in financing firms is the ratio of private sector bank 
loans to gross domestic product (GDP).  From table 1 we observe that, with the exception 
of a very low (high) ratio for Palestine (Lebanon), the proportion of private sector bank 
debt to GDP varies from approximately 40 percent for Saudi Arabia to just over 100 
percent for Jordan.  Bank debt is the primary source of debt for most Arab firms.  There is 
a thin primary corporate bond market but there is no formal secondary market for trading 
in these securities.   
The preference for informed debt to arm’s length debt is only partially attributable 
to the lack of a secondary market for debt.  There are other reasons why bank debt is 
preferred over arm’s length debt in the Arab world.  First, banks are frequently holders of 
the borrowing firm’s stock and give loans with better terms and conditions. Second, the 
long-term relationship between banks and their clients enhances the performance of the 
firms  and  lowers  bankruptcy  costs  and  risks;  consequently,  banks  are  willing  to 
renegotiate loans and would be less likely to take legal action against the firm (Antoniou, 
et  al.  (2002)).  Finally,  banking  relationships  are  often  associated  with  bank 
representatives serving on the clients’ corporate board of directors.  When combined with 
bank  equity  ownership,  this  minimizes  both  manager-shareholder  and  bondholder-
shareholder agency conflicts and costs.  
 
4.  Hypotheses Development and Variable Descriptions 
In this section we develop the hypotheses and the variables used in the regression 
models to test the various hypotheses.   
 
a. Hypotheses Development 
As discussed previously, the Arab world provides us with a rare opportunity to test 
the tax model of capital structure in a natural setting.  These economies are characterized 
by relatively homogeneous traits in many respects, with the exception that some of the  
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countries do not have corporate taxes.  Such a situation should give us a clearer answer as 
to whether taxes affect the level of a firm’s leverage.  If firms in the taxed Arab states use 
more debt than those in the non-taxed Arab states, then it would appear that taxes do 
affect the choice of capital structure thus supporting the debt tax shield model of capital 
structure. This leads us to the first testable hypothesis of the paper.  
H1: Firms in Arab states with a corporate tax regime are expected to have higher 
leverage than those in states with no corporate taxes.  
While  differences  in  leverage  between  taxed  and  non-taxed  regimes  may  be 
consistent with the tax hypothesis of capital structure, to test the robustness of the tax 
model we further examine the relationship between the firm’s level of leverage and its 
marginal tax rate (MTR). If the tax model of capital structure theory is valid, the level of 
leverage should be positively related to the firm’s MTR because MTR measures the size 
of the tax break the firm will get when it pays interest. This leads us to the second testable 
hypothesis of this paper: 
H2: In Arab states that levy corporate income taxes, leverage is expected to be 
positively related to the marginal tax rate. 
The  third  hypothesis  tests  DeAngelo  and  Masulis’  (1980)  non-debt  tax  shield 
(NDTS) effect.  If NDTS is a substitute for the debt tax shield then leverage and NDTS 
should be negatively related in taxed countries.  Thus: 
H3: Non-debt tax shield is expected to be negatively related to leverage in taxed 
Arab economies but not in non-taxed tax Arab economies. 
One caveat with respect to testing the above hypothesis is the previously reported mixed 
evidence with respect to empirical measures of NDTS and firm leverage.  Most studies 
document a positive coefficient  for NDTS  suggesting that NDTS  is  proxying for the 
collateral effect of debt.  If NDTS proxies for its intended effect, we should find that it 
should have a negative association with leverage in taxed Arab countries but not in the 
non-taxed Arab economies.  On the other hand if NDTS proxies for the collateral effect 
we  should  observe  a  positive  relationship  between  leverage  and  NDTS  in  non-taxed 
countries and either a positive, negative or insignificant coefficient for NDTS in taxable  
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regimes depending on the relative strength of the substitution vs. collateral effects. 
Finally, we test the personal tax aspect of the capital structure theory.  In Arab 
countries with taxes, dividends and capital gains are either not taxed or taxed at a lower 
level than interest income (see Table 1). This tax bias towards dividend income over 
interest income at the personal level should lower the use of leverage, ceteris paribus.  
Testing the personal tax effect is not easy owing to the difficulty in capturing the relative 
personal tax effect of interest and dividend income to the marginal investor.  We use the 
dividend payout ratio as a rough proxy to capture the relative personal tax advantage of 
dividend income, i.e., firms that pay out a higher proportion of their earnings as dividends 
do so because of lower relative marginal tax rates on dividend income.  Thus, a negative 
relationship between dividend yield and leverage is posited.  Note that this would hold 
for taxed Arab economies but not non-taxed Arab states.  Hence, we can state the fourth 
testable hypothesis as follows: 
H4: In accordance with the personal tax model of capital structure, in taxed Arab 
economies, firms with relatively higher dividend yield will use less leverage than 
firms with lower dividend yields. 
The above four hypotheses will be tested using a pooled regression framework with 
alternative  measures  of  debt  leverage  as  the  dependent  variable.    The  explanatory 
variables consist of tax-related proxies to test the above hypotheses.  Additionally, the 
independent variables include a number of control variables deemed important from prior 
literature.   
 
b. Measures of Debt 
Similar to Titman and Wessels (1988) in the US, we use six debt ratios as dependent 
variables to test the determinants of capital structure in Arab firms. These ratios are: 
short-term debt (STD), long-term debt (LTD), and total debt (TD) divided alternatively 
by book and market values of equity.   
 
c. Explanatory Variables    
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In this section we elaborate on variables used to test the hypotheses previously 
described and other control variables.   
Collateral 
Issuing  debt  secured  by  tangible  property  reduces  losses  associated  with 
information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf (1984)) and asset substitution (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Long and Malitz (1985), among others).  Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
note that collateralizing debt diminishes the risk of lenders suffering from the agency 
costs of debt.  Additionally, the literature recognizes that tangible assets retain a greater 
value in liquidation and creditors are more likely to impose greater restrictions when a 
firm has fewer tangible assets thereby increasing the cost of debt.  Consistent with these 
arguments, most empirical studies on capital structure find debt to be positively related to 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.  We measure collateral as the ratio of tangible 
assets to total assets (TANTA).   
Non-Debt Tax Shield 
According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) tax deductions for depreciation, losses, 
and  investment  tax  credits  are  substitutes  for  the  tax  benefits  of  debt  financing.  
Consequently, an inverse relationship between debt and non-debt tax shields is to be 
expected.  Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) is calculated as the sum of annual depreciation 
charges  and  investment  tax  credits  divided  by  the  sum  of  annual  earnings  before 
depreciation, interest, and taxes.  
Growth 
Myers  (1977)  shows  that  highly  leveraged  firms  are  more  likely  to  pass  up 
profitable investment opportunities; therefore, firms with higher future growth should use 
less debt and more equity financing to mitigate this agency problem.  However, as noted 
by Titman and Wessels (1988) this relationship may be moderated for short term debt and 
may even be positive.  Consistent with many other studies in the area we use the market-
to-book ratio of equity (MB) as a proxy for growth.  
Size 
Warner  (1977)  suggests  that  leverage  ratios  might  be  related  to  firm  size.    He 
provides evidence that relative bankruptcy costs are negatively correlated with firm size 
for railroad companies.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that size can be considered a  
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proxy for the inverse probability of default and should not be significant in countries 
where  the  costs  of  financial  distress  are  low.  Given  that  most  developing  countries 
including the Arab countries studied here probably have a weak secondary market for 
assets and a weak takeover market, bankruptcy costs are expected to be high.  The natural 
log of sales, LNS, is used as a proxy for size in this study. Previous studies show that size 
usually exhibits a positive relationship with long-term debt and a negative relationship 
with short-term debt (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988)). 
Volatility 
Bradley, et al.’s (1984) theoretical analysis suggests that volatility and optimal debt 
ratio are inversely related.  Their empirical results conform to their theoretical hypothesis.  
Several other studies include volatility as a determinant of leverage including Titman and 
Wessels  (1988),  Hovakimian  et  al.  (2001),  and  Ferri  and  Jones  (1979).    We  define  
volatility as the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total 
assets (SDOE). 
Profitability 
Myers (1977) cites evidence from other empirical work suggesting that firms follow 
a pecking order in their financing sources, first from retained earnings, second from debt, 
and  finally  from  issuing  new  equity.    Myers  and  Majluf  (1984)  state  that  firms  use 
retained  earnings  as  the  first  and  safest  source  of  financing  to  mitigate  information 
asymmetry and transaction costs.  This argument suggests that a firm’s profitability is 
inversely related to its use of debt leverage.  Using an agency framework, Jensen (1986) 
suggests a positive relationship since, in a strong corporate control market, firms are 
forced to commit to paying cash by leveraging up. Shareholders use debt as a disciplinary 
tool against managers to avoid consumption of excess perquisites.  In their international 
examination of debt determinants, Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that investors are 
more willing to lend to firms with high profits, thus reducing the cost of debt, providing 
incentives for profitable firms to use more debt.  In this study we use the ratio of earnings 
before  interest  and  taxes  to  total  assets  to  capture  profitability’s  relation  to  debt 
(EBITTA). 
Marginal Tax Rate  
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The tax model of capital structure implies that firms subject to a higher marginal tax 
rate have an incentive to use more debt. As in most studies (e.g., Booth et al. (2001) and 
Hovakimian et al. (2001)), MTR is calculated as taxes paid divided by earnings before 
taxes.   
Dividends 
We use dividends divided by net income (DIVNI) to proxy for the relative personal 
tax effect of dividends on debt choice. A higher payout ratio implies a relatively lower 
marginal  tax  rate  on  dividend  income  relative  to  interest  income,  thus  an  inverse 
relationship between leverage and DIV/NI is expected for taxed Arab countries. 
Table  2  summarizes  the  determinants  of  debt  discussed  above  along  with  their 
expected signs. 
 
5.  Data and Methodology 
There exists no set of ready data (for example, the equivalent of Compustat and 
CRSP for the US) in the Arab world, thus data gathering was a challenging part of the 
study.    The  two  most  common  sources  of  data  in  previous  investigations  of  capital 
structure  determinants  in  an  international  setting  are  Compustat  Global  Vantage  and 
International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC).    The  Compustat  Global  Vantage  used  in  a 
number of studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995)) had at most 5 companies in each of 
the Arab states that are a part of this study; moreover even when data was available it 
tended to be spotty.  The IFC database (used, for example, by Booth et al. (2001) and 
Singh and Hamid (1995)) has selected balance sheet and income statement data for the 
largest companies for various countries.  The drawback of the IFC database as noted by 
Booth et al. (2001) and Singh and Hamid (1995) is that the financial statement variables 
tend to be at a high level of aggregation.  For example, short term debt and depreciation 
are not available which limits the testing of the theories.  In view of the limitations of the 
Global Vantage and IFC databases, we decided to assemble the dataset for the study from 
multiple sources while at the same time ensuring data reliability. 
The data for the study is largely gathered from financial statements maintained by 
private and state-sponsored sources like Shuaa’ Capital, a private financial institution in  
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the UAE (a securities firm with businesses in brokerage and investment banking) and 
Alshabaca (an information-based institution that was established by the Union of Arab 
Stock Exchanges), and supplemented with data from the Arab Monetary Fund, IFC and 
other published sources.  In addition, some data are obtained from financial statements 
found at company websites, some are requested from companies themselves, and some 
are  obtained  through  personal  contacts,  especially  in  Palestine  and  Jordan.  Where 
possible, data are crosschecked against two sources to ensure reliability.
6 
The data covers the period 1996-2001 for the listed non-financial companies in the 
stock markets of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, 
Qatar,  Saudi Arabia, Tunisia  and  the UAE.  The  resulting  dataset  consists  of  461 
companies and 1,115 firm years (1 to 5 years per firm) worth of data. Table 3 gives a 
description of the sample. Table 4 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the 
models.
7 The table is broken into 3 panels.  Panel A presents data for the full sample, 
while  panels  B  and  C  present  data  for  the  taxed  and  non -taxed Arab  economies, 
respectively.  Table 5 shows the pair-wise correlation matrix for all independent variables 
used in the main regression models. The correlation matrix does not suggest any serious 
concerns for multicollinearity problems. 
To test the hypotheses we estimate cross-section time series regression models with 
debt ratio as the dependent variable and explanatory variables that capture the 
hypothesized effects and other determinants of capital structure. Accordingly, the general 
empirical model is expressed as: 










, , , 0
,
,                                (1) 
The dependent variable, debt ratio, is defined as the book value of debt (D) divided 
by the value of equity (E).  We use three measures of debt (short term, long term, and 
total debt) and two measures of equity (book value and market value) for a total of six 
proxies for the debt ratio.  It is important to recognize the dependent variable proxies all 
                                                        
6 Since data are gathered from several different countries there is a legitimate concern as to the differences 
in accounting conventions across the countries.  Barakat (2003) observes that accounting conventions in the 
sample countries are similar and that all adhere to international accounting standards. 
7 To avoid outlier problems data was winsorized by dropping the upper and lower 1% of observations.  
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suffer  from  the  limited  dependent  variable  problem  given  that  the  debt  ratio  is  left 
censored  at  zero.    Greene  (1997)  shows  that,  by  construction,  the  error  term  of  the 
truncated model has zero mean but it is heteroscedastic. Thus, using OLS will cause the 
loss of both efficiency and unbiasedness. The use of a censored regression model will 
produce  slopes  and  standard  errors  that  are  consistent  and  more  efficient  than  those 
obtained from OLS regression.  Consequently, and consistent with a number of studies in 
the area (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Hovakimian et al. (2001)), we use the 
heteroscedastic Tobit model to provide regression estimates in our tests.  
To test the first hypothesis that firms in taxed Arab countries use more leverage 
than non-taxed Arab countries we run several versions of the basic regression model (1).  
The first two models may be considered to be parsimonious models.  In the first model 
we regress debt leverage on a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is domiciled in 
a country that imposes corporate income taxes (DTAX) and 0 otherwise.  In the second 
model, in addition to DTAX, we include size as a control variable (log of sales, LNS).  
The two parsimonious models may be expressed as:  
      DTAX
E
D
1 0                      (2) 
        LNS DTAX
E
D
2 1 0                             (3)   
Equation (2) simply tests whether the average firm leverage ratio for taxed Arab countries 
is different than for non-taxed countries without any controlling variables.  This can be 
viewed as an aggregate level test based on individual company data.  In equation (3) in 
addition to the dummy tax variable we include size (LNS) as a controlling variable.  Since 
size has been a significant determinant of leverage in most studies it would be appropriate 
to include it in any empirical test of capital structure.  In addition to the above two 
parsimonious models, we consider a third model that adds a number of additional control 
variables besides size: 
 
  
      
 
       
EBITTA SDOE




6 5 4 3 2 1 0
                                                                                      
    (4)  
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The  additional  variables  included  are  non-debt  tax  shield  (NDTS),  which  could 
proxy for collateral or the non-debt tax shield effect; a proxy for growth, market to book 
ratio (MB); dividend payout ratio (DIVNI); a proxy for collateral value of assets, the ratio 
of tangible assets to total assets (TANTA); volatility of earnings (SDOE); and a proxy for 
profitability, ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (EBITTA).  In all of 
the above models a finding of a positive coefficient for the dummy tax regime variable, 
DTAX, would support the hypothesis that the availability of potential debt tax shields is 
an important determinant of corporate borrowing.   
The  second  hypothesis  tests  the  effect  of  the  marginal  tax  rate  on  the  level  of 
leverage in Arab countries that impose corporate taxes.  We do this by interacting our 
proxy for the marginal tax rate (MTR=taxes paid/earnings before taxes) with the DTAX 
dummy variable.
8  The empirical equation to test this hypothesis is given below: 
   
     
  
      
EBITTA SDOE LNS




5 4 3 2 1 0
                                                                                  
*
       (5) 
The  NDTS  variable  in  equation  4  or  5  captures  the  effect  of  depreciation  and 
investment  tax  credit  on  the  firm’s  level  of  leverage  for  all  firms  regardless  of  the 
corporate tax environment.  Recall that the empirical specification of NDTS can proxy for 
the collateral and/or the substitution effect.  To separate the effect of NDTS in taxable 
economies (which may be subject to both effects) from that in non-taxable economies 
(which are subject only to the collateral effect) we replace NDTS with two interaction 
variables that capture the differential effects of NDTS between taxed and non-taxed Arab 
states.  The first interaction variable is NDTS*DTAX, which captures the effect of non-
debt tax shield in economies with corporate taxes.  To capture the effect in non-debt 
taxed economies we interact NDTS with a dummy variable, DNOTAX, which takes on the 
value  1  for  firms  operating  in  non-tax  countries  and  0  otherwise.    The  resulting 
interaction term is labeled NDTS*DNOTAX. The regression model to test the differential 
effects of NDTS in taxed and non-taxed regimes is given by:  
                                                        
8 We use an interaction variable rather than simply including MTR as an explanatory variable because some 
of the non-tax countries impose a minimal ―tax‖ on all individuals and companies, which constitutes a 
―charity‖  (referred  to  as  zakat).    Since  this  would  result  in  a  positive  MTR  value  we  suppress  it  by 
interacting our calculated MTR variable with the dummy tax variable, DTAX.  
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     
    
    
     
EBITTA SDOE LNS TANTA DIVNI
MB DNOTAX NDTS DTAX NDTS DTAX MTR
E
D
9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
                                        
* * *
        (6) 
In our final hypothesis we test the impact on leverage of the relative personal tax 
rate on dividend income and interest income.  As argued earlier, higher relative personal 
tax rates on dividend income (compared to interest income) should have a direct impact 
on corporate leverage.  This applies to taxed Arab countries but not to non-taxed Arab 
economies.  To test this we interact the dividend payout ratio, DIVNI, the proxy for the 
relative personal tax advantage of dividends, with the tax dummy variable, DTAX.  A 
finding of an inverse coefficient for the resulting interaction term (DIVNI*DTAX) would 
suggest  that  a relative  personal  tax advantage  to  equity may offset  the corporate tax 
advantage of debt.  Note that in the estimated model we include DIVNI as a separate 
variable to control for any independent effects of dividend payout ratio on debt leverage.  
The specific model to test the personal tax advantage effect of equity is as follows: 
    
     
    
      
EBITTA SDOE LNS TANTA
DTAX DIVNI DIVNI MB NDTS DTAX MTR
E
D
9 8 7 6
5 5 4 2 1 0
                                                      
* *
        (7) 
 
6. Empirical results 
The first hypothesis predicts that leverage ratios will be higher in taxed Arab states 
compared to non-taxed Arab states.  Table 6 presents regression estimates of the two 
parsimonious models of the test of the first hypothesis.  Panel A presents estimates with 
DTAX, the dummy variable for taxable regime, as the only explanatory variable.  Six sets 
of estimates are presented depending upon how the dependent variable, debt ratio, is 
calculated.  The first three models use the book values of short-term debt, long-term debt, 
and total debt to the book value of equity as the dependent variable, respectively.  The 
next three models use the same measures of debt but are now scaled by the market value 
of  equity.    The  six  models  are  labeled:  STDBV,  LTDBV,  TDBV,  STDMV,  LTDMV, 
TDMV, respectively.  Panel B is structured similar to panel A but, in addition to the 
dummy tax variable, size is included as a control variable.  In panel A we observe that the 
coefficient for DTAX is generally positive and is significant when regressed on LTDBV  
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and LTDMV.  In panel B when size is introduced as a control variable the coefficient for 
DTAX is always positive and is significant in three of the six models.  Table 7 presents 
model  estimates  with  the  full  set  of  control  variables.    The  coefficient  for  DTAX  is 
positive across all 6 models and significantly so in all instances with the exception of the 
first equation where STDBV is the dependent variable.   
The results in tables 6 and 7 provide substantial empirical support for the fact that 
firms in taxed Arab states use more debt than non-tax Arab states. This result conforms to 
the predictions of the debt tax shield theory of capital structure as outlined by MM. 
The second hypothesis examines the tax shield hypothesis of debt using a proxy for 
the marginal tax rate of debt.  This should be a more powerful test of the hypothesis 
compared to the use of the DTAX explanatory variable, which merely tests whether the 
debt ratio in taxable economies is significantly greater than in non-taxable economies.  
Table 8 presents the results of the regression estimates for equation (5) using the effective 
tax rate for firms domiciled in taxable Arab economies.  We only present results using the 
full  set  of  control  variables.    As  can  be  seen  the  coefficient  for  MTR*DTAX  is 
significantly positive in all six models as expected under the tax hypothesis.  
Antoniou,  et  al.  (2002)  did  not  find  any  significant  effect  of  corporate  tax  on 
financial  decisions  in  Europe.  Givoly,  et  al.  (1992)  find  the  effective  tax  rate  to  be 
positive and significant for US firms. Graham (1996) finds that firms with higher MTR 
issue more debt than those with smaller MTR. Booth, et al. (2001) use the statutory tax 
rate instead of MTR and find the perverse result of a positive relationship with leverage in 
their sample of firms from developing countries. The conclusion from our study is that in 
taxed Arab countries leverage and MTR are positive related consistent with the tax based 
model of the STO capital structure theory.  
Table 9 presents results of the third hypothesis on the role of non-debt tax shield on 
debt choice.  Recall that we test for the effect of NDTS on taxable and non-taxable Arab 
economies  by interacting  NDTS with  separate  dummy variables for taxable and non-
taxable  regimes,  i.e.,  NDTS*DTAX  and  NDTS*DNOTAX.    Table  9  reveals  that  the 
coefficient for NDTS*DNOTAX is always positive and significantly so in 4 out of the 6 
models.  Thus, it appears that leverage is positively related to depreciation expense in 
non-taxed economies, implying that NDTS captures collateral value in these economies  
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(as noted in several Western-based studies).  Interestingly enough, in taxed Arab states 
NDTS is not significant.  A possible explanation for the insignificance of NDTS*DTAX is 
that in a taxable regime NDTS proxies for both the non-debt tax shield effect as well as 
for the collateral effect; however, because the two effects are opposing in nature the 
resulting  coefficient  is  insignificant.    Thus,  the  insignificance  of  the  NDTS  in  taxed 
economies but positive significance in non-taxed economies provides indirect support for 
DeAngelo and Masulis’s substitution argument. 
Our final hypothesis examines the personal tax implications for debt policy using 
the dividend payout ratio as a proxy for the relative personal tax advantage of dividends 
to debt income.  Specifically we test the hypothesis by interacting the payout ratio with 
the dummy variable for taxable regimes, DIVNI*DTAX.  The coefficient is significant in 
2 of the 6 models as can be seen from Table 10.  The coefficient for the interaction term 
is significantly positive when long term debt is the dependent variable.  Contrary to the 
personal tax hypothesis higher dividend payout firms (which are personal tax advantage 
biased towards dividends over interest) are associated with greater use of long term debt.  
Assuming our proxy for the personal tax effect (DIVNI) is reasonable, these findings do 
not support the hypothesis that personal taxes influence leverage choice.  In this regard 
the Arab evidence is consistent with most previous evidence for non-Arab countries.  
Results for Non-Tax Related Variables 
The results show a positive and significant relationship between debt-to-book value 
of equity ratios and growth (MB) and a consistently negative relationship between debt-
to-market value of equity ratios and growth. The positive and significant coefficient for 
MB in the debt-to-book value of equity equations could be due to the fact that most debt 
in the Arab world is in the form of bank loans.  Banks have strong ties with borrowing 
firms  stemming  from  a  number  of  reasons  including:  (1)  banks  foster  long-term 
relationships with their clients, (2) banks are major partners in client firms by serving as 
members of the firms’ boards and advising committees, and (3) banks may have partial 
ownership  stakes  in  their  client  firms.  Therefore,  we  expect  debt  agency  costs  to  be 
relatively lower in Arab countries.  Consequently, growth is not expected to cause any 
serious agency conflicts. On the contrary, growth may portend a promising future for the 
firm, encouraging banks to provide them with loans. Our results for the book measures of  
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debt are consistent with this view of a positive relationship between growth and leverage. 
On the other hand, the negative relationship between the debt-to-market value of equity 
and MB is probably an artifact of the time series nature of the data.  The increase in 
market prices of equity in the late 1990s caused the leverage ratios to be understated 
while MB ratios increased resulting in an inverse relationship between the two variables.  
In  sum  our  results  for  the  Arab  countries  are  contrary  to  those  found  in  Western 
economies that document, consistent with the agency framework, an inverse relationship 
between growth and leverage. 
The dividend payout ratio, DIVNI, is generally negative and significant in models 
using long-term debt or total debt as the dependent variable.  The negative relation can be 
explained by the fact that banks (the primary source of debt in the Arab world) prefer 
firms that pay low dividends.  The inverse relation is also consistent with the view that 
debt holders impose stringent covenants on dividend constraints.  
Collateral (TANTA) is positive and significant for both long term and total debt 
ratios.  This is consistent with the theory in that the availability of collateral increases the 
debt capacity of the firm.   Our results are consistent with those documented for Western 
economies.  
The coefficient for the size variable (LNS) is positive and significant for all debt 
ratios, with higher magnitudes for long-term debt and total debt than for short-term debt 
ratios. Given that most developing countries including the Arab countries studied here 
probably  have  a  weak  secondary  market  for  assets  and  a  weak  takeover  market, 
bankruptcy costs are expected to be high.  Thus, a significant positive coefficient for size 
implies that debt holders are sensitive to bankruptcy costs.  The results are consistent 
with that observed in the US (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988)).   
The  coefficient  for  earnings  volatility  (SDOE)  is  generally  negative  but  lacks 
statistical significance.  The lack of significance may be attributed to the limited time 
series  data  needed  to  calculate  the  volatility  measure.    The  negative  coefficient  for 
volatility  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  borrowing  capacity  and  default  risk  are 
inversely related.  These results are consistent with those documented by Brickley et al. 
(1984) for the US.   
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Finally,  the  results  show  that  the  relationship  between  the  level  of  debt  and 
profitability is significantly negative for all debt ratios.   Other US  and international 
studies  find  similar  results  suggesting  support  of  the  pecking  order  model  of  capital 
structure.  
Robustness tests 
We conduct several robustness tests.  Our first robustness test involves dropping the 
SDOE variable and repeating all the regression tests.  From Table 4 note that SDOE is a 
limiting variable with number of observations that is approximately half of the other 
variables considered in the study.  This is a reflection of the fact that we have limited 
panel data and estimation of SDOE requires that we have at least three consecutive years 
of data.  The sample size for the regression tests are approximately doubled in size after 
dropping  this  variable  approximately.    The  results  (not  shown)  are  qualitatively  and 
quantitatively very similar, albeit of stronger statistical significance.   
Our second set of robustness tests allow for inclusion of additional variables that 
capture the unique corporate ownership structure of Arab economies.  Arab companies 
are  associated  with  significant  family  ownership  concentrations,  many  of  whom  are 
actively involved in managing the firm as well.  The impact of family ownership on debt 
is not obvious.  Family ownership may lead to increased debt usage because the founding 
families may wish to avoid ownership dilution and reduce the risk of losing control of the 
firm.    On  the  other  hand,  many  Arab  banks  themselves  are  family  owned  with 
crossholdings  in  the  businesses  they  lend  to  thus  promoting  leverage.      For  our  full 
sample,  family  ownership  (by  the  founding  family)  of  equity  represents  a  mean 
proportion of 44%.  The mean family ownership is approximately the same for taxed and 
non-taxed  economies.    Arab  firms  are  also  characterized  by  significant  government 
ownership of equity.  Antoniou, et al. (2002) suggest that if the government is an owner 
in firms, these firms are expected to have a higher level of debt because of the assurance 
effect the government has on the lenders and because of the lower probability of agency 
conflicts. For our sample, the mean proportion of equity held by the government is 16% 
and is approximately the same when data is parsed by corporate tax regime.   
We find that our main regression results (not shown) are qualitatively the same 
when  family  ownership  and  government  ownership  are  introduced  as  additional  
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explanatory variables. The regression estimates also show that the coefficient of family 
ownership is positive and significant in most  models while government ownership is 
positive but not significant. The positive coefficient for family ownership is consistent 
with the view that family owned firms eschew external equity in favor of debt due to 
dilution  and/or  low  debt  aversion  considerations  as  outlined  above.    With  regard  to 
government  ownership,  the  evidence  does  not  support  the  view  that  government 
ownership  is  associated  with  an  implicit  assurance  that  the  firm  will  not  fail  and, 
therefore,  an  increased  willingness  to  lend  to  such  firms.    The  insignificance  of  the 
government  ownership  coefficient  however  may  also  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that 
governments  are  privatizing  and  the  value  of  any  implicit  assurance  associated  with 
government ownership has diminished.  
Our next robustness test considers potential confounding effects arising from the 
fact that taxed Arab states appear to be less prosperous than their non-taxed counterparts.  
This is evident from a casual inspection of Table 1, which reveals generally higher GDP 
and per capita incomes for the non-taxed Arab states compared to the taxed states.  We 
control for this potential bias by including per capita income as an additional explanatory 
variable.  Our results (not shown) suggest that the findings are robust to this potential 
bias.    
We also estimate the regressions with individual country dummy variables added to 
the various models.  As in Booth et al. (2001), we do this to control for country specific 
variables that may have been omitted, yet may have an impact on firm leverage.  Our 
main results still hold, although similar to Booth et al. we find that some of the country 
dummy  variables  are  significant  suggesting  that  there  may  be  additional  (country 
specific) determinants of leverage not specified in the model. 
Our  final  robustness  test  involves  sensitivity  of  the  results  to  the  particular 
regression estimation procedure employed.  While we argue for and present results using 
the heteroscedastic Tobit estimation procedure, we find that the results are qualitatively 
unaffected  when  alternate estimation  procedures are used: OLS, maximum  likelihood 
with random and fixed effects and non-heteroscedastic Tobit.  
        
7. Conclusions  
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The  main  finding  of  this  paper  is  that  the  tax  models  of  capital  structure  are 
supported  by  empirical  evidence  from  economies  that  are  distinctly  different  from 
Western economies. More specifically: 
(1) Firms operating in Arab states that have a corporate tax system in place utilize 
more debt than those operating in countries that do not have a corporate tax 
system.  
(2)  The effective marginal tax rate has a positive and significant impact on financial 
leverage.  This implies firms with higher  MTR utilize more debt because of 
greater debt tax shield benefits.  
(3)  Our  proxy  for  non-debt  tax  shield  (NDTS),  depreciation  and  investment  tax 
credit to total assets, is a positive and significant determinant of capital structure 
in non-tax Arab economies. This implies that NDTS is proxying for collateral. 
However, for firms operating in countries that have a tax system we find that 
NDTS is not significant.  The insignificance of NDTS in taxable economies in 
conjunction with positive significance in non-taxed economies is consistent with 
the  view  that  in  tax  countries  NDTS  is  picking  up  both  a  collateral  and 
substitution effect.  
 (4) Personal taxes do not appear to have an impact on capital structure choice in 
taxed Arab countries. 
In addition to testing the tax aspects of capital structure theory, we document that a 
number of non-tax determinants of leverage are portable internationally including Arab 
nations.  Like Rajan and Zingales (1995), who examine G7 countries, and Booth et al., 
who examine 10 developing countries, we find that corporate debt in the Arab world are 
systematically influenced by size, profitability, and collateral.  However, we also find 
differences; for example, we find that leverage (book value) and growth are positively 
related for Arab countries contrary to the inverse relationship commonly noted in the US 
and other developed countries (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995)).   
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Table 1 
Tax and Selected Economic Variables for the Arab Economies in the Sample 
 
This table presents data on tax rates and other institutional data for the sample of Arab countries included in this study.  The corporate tax rate 
shown is for a domestic corporation that is locally owned.  The personal tax rates on dividends and on interest income are for domestic investors.  
GDP is the Gross Domestic Product expressed in US$.  Listed companies refers to the number of companies listed in the primary exchange.  Mkt. 
Cap. is the market capitalization of all listed stocks.  Mkt. Cap/GDP is the market capitalization of listed firms as a percent of the GDP.  Trading 
Vol./Mkt. Cap. is the trading volume of common stocks on the primary exchange as a percent of market capitalization.  Bank credit-% of GDP is 
private bank credit as a percent of GDP.   All figures are for 2001.  
 
  Morocco  Tunisia  UAE  Qatar  Oman  Lebanon  Kuwait  Jordan  Saudi  Egypt  Bahrain  Palestine 
 
Corporate. tax rate   35%  35%  0%  0%  0-7.5%  10%  0%  15-35%  0%  32-40%  0%  20% 
Pers. tax rate—divs.   0%    0%  0%  0%  0%  5%  0%  10%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Pers. Tax rate—interest  13-44%  0-35%  0%  0%  0%  2-28%  0%  5-30%  0%  10-48%  0%  5-35% 
Pers. Tax rate—cap. gains  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
GDP (In Mill. US$)  33,491  20,043  67,761  16,152  19,945  16,709  32,812  8,829  186,489  91,064  7,936  4,012 
Per capita GDP (US$)  1,146  2,072  20,602  28,140  8,314  4,399  14,629  1,704  8,197  1,409  11,115  1,236 
Listed companies  55  45  27  23  96  14  88  161  76  1,110  42  23 
Mkt. Cap. (Mill. US$)   9,031  2,230  154,270  6,678  2,634  1,248  26,662  6,314  73,201  24,309  6,601  743 
Mkt. Cap/ GDP    25%  11%  228%  41%  13%  7.5%  87%  73%  40%  24%  63%  20% 
Trading Vol./ Mkt. Cap.   9%  15%  9%  24%  16%  4%  44%  15%  34%  24%  4%  5% 
Bank credit-% of GDP  88%  66%  45%  47%  42%  202%  94%  102%  39%  95%  40%  24% 
  




Summary of the Determinants of Capital Structure and their Expected Signs 
 
This table summarizes the explanatory variables (column 1) used in the study, their definitions 
(column 2), the attribute they indicate (column 3), and their hypothesized impact on leverage for 















Effect of debt 
tax shield 
NA  +  NA 
MTR  Marginal tax 
rate 
Effect debt tax 
shield 
NA  +  NA 




NA  -  NA 






NA  -  NA 




-/?  -/?  -/? 
TANTA  Tangible assets 
divided by total 
assets 
Collateral  +  +  + 
LNS  Natural log of 
sales 
Size  +  +  + 
SDOE  Standard 
deviation of 
earnings scaled 
by total assets 
Volatility, 
business risk 
-  -  - 
EBITTA  Earnings 
before interest 
and taxes 
divided by total 
assets 










Country-Company Data Summary 
 
The table below shows the sample size from each of the Arab countries included in the study.  
Column 1 identifies the particular country.  Column 2 shows the total number of companies listed 
on the individual country’s stock exchange.  Column 3 shows the number of non-financial listed 
companies for which data were available for inclusion in the study.  The last column shows the 
number of company-years of data available for each country.   
 






Jordan  161  141  401 
Bahrain  41  19  56 
Tunisia  44  9  13 
Saudi  75  62  176 
Oman  131  52  69 
Kuwait  86  65  133 
Lebanon  13  5  12 
Egypt  1,071  69  158 
Morocco  55  1  3 
Palestine  23  6  12 
Qatar  22  9  19 
UAE  35  23  63 
Total  1,757  461  1,115 
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Table 4 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents sample descriptive statistics for firms in the full sample (Panel A), firms in taxed 
Arab countries (Panel B), and firms in non-taxed Arab countries (Panel C).  Each panel shows number 
of observations, N (column 2), mean (column 3), standard deviation, STDV (column 4), and the 90
th 
and 10
th percentile values (columns 5 and 6, respectively) for each of the explanatory and dependent 
variables used in the study.  The explanatory variables are: DTAX=dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is 
in a taxed Arab country, 0 otherwise; MTR=marginal tax rate defined as taxes paid divided by income 
before taxes;  NDTS=non debt tax shield  defined  as  sum  of  depreciation and  investment  tax  credit 
divided by total assets; MB= market price per share divided by book value per share; DIVNI= dividends 
paid divided by net income; LNS=natural log of sales; TANTA= tangible assets divided by total assets; 
SDOE= standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxed scaled by total assets; and EBITTA= 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.  The dependent variables are defined as 
follows (debt is always in book value): TDBV= total debt divided by book value of equity, TDMV= total 
debt divided by market value of equity, LTDBV= long term debt divided by book value of equity, 
LTDMV= long term debt divided by market value of equity, STDBV= short term debt divided by book 
value of equity, and STDMV= short term debt divided by market value of equity. 
Panel A: Full sample 




Explanatory Variables:           
DTAX  1094  0.476  0.500  1.000  0.000 
MTR  1084  0.055  0.140  0.198  0.000 
NDTS  1044  0.044  0.087  0.118  0.000 
MB  1068  1.411  1.427  2.759  0.356 
DIVNI  1046  0.281  0.416  0.846  0.000 
LNS  1054  16.695  2.169  19.251  13.890 
TANTA  1074  0.411  0.260  0.775  0.044 
SDOE  618  0.438  0.427  1.027  0.040 
EBITTA  1036  0.105  0.137  0.218  0.010 
Dependent Variables:           
TDBV  1057  0.289  0.500  0.863  0.000 
TDMV  1047  0.288  0.509  0.898  0.000 
LTDBV  1060  0.211  0.418  0.591  0.000 
LTDMV  1054  0.216  0.427  0.677  0.000 
STDBV  1082  0.103  0.306  0.330  0.000 
STDMV  1071  0.100  0.320  0.250  0.000 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Panel B:  Non-taxed Arab countries 




Explanatory Variables:           
NDTS  546  0.044  0.084  0.122  0.000 
MB  559  1.422  1.505  2.845  0.325 
DIVNI  544  0.261  0.372  0.790  0.000 
LNS  549  16.873  2.146  19.139  14.047 
TANTA  561  0.417  0.253  0.776  0.052 
SDOE  347  0.406  0.413  1.009  0.036 
EBITTA  556  0.099  0.103  0.260  0.008 
Dependent Variables:           
TDBV  551  0.293  0.497  0.930  0.000 
TDMV  543  0.267  0.498  0.833  0.000 
LTDBV  553  0.203  0.418  0.664  0.000 
LTDMV  550  0.182  0.390  0.604  0.000 
STDBV  556  0.095  0.264  0.344  0.000 
STDMV  559  0.101  0.337  0.225  0.000 
 
Panel C:  Taxed Arab countries 




Explanatory Variables:           
MTR  515  0.055  0.137  0.190  0.000 
NDTS  498  0.044  0.089  0.112  0.000 
MB  509  1.399  1.337  2.700  0.397 
DIVNI  502  0.302  0.458  0.928  0.000 
LNS  505  16.501  2.179  19.445  13.692 
TANTA  513  0.404  0.266  0.773  0.038 
SDOE  271  0.479  0.441  1.090  0.051 
EBITTA  480  0.113  0.168  0.268  0.011 
Dependent Variables:           
TDBV  506  0.286  0.504  0.820  0.000 
TDMV  504  0.310  0.520  1.460  0.000 
LTDBV  507  0.220  0.418  0.583  0.000 
LTDMV  504  0.253  0.461  0.788  0.000 
STDBV  516  0.111  0.347  0.290  0.000 
STDMV  512  0.100  0.300  0.289  0.000  
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Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables (Continuous) used in Models 
 
This table present pair-wise correlations between the various explanatory variables (continuous) used in the regressions. MTR=marginal tax rate 
defined as taxes paid divided by income before taxes; NDTS=non debt tax shield defined as sum of depreciation and investment tax credit divided by 
total assets; MB= market price per share divided by book value per share; DIVNI= dividends paid divided by net income; TANTA= tangible assets 
divided by total assets; LNS=natural log of sales; SDOE= standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxed scaled by total assets; and EBITTA= 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.  
 
 
  MTR  NDTS  MB  DIVNI  TANTA  LNS  SDOE  EBITTA 
MTR  1.00               
NDTS  0.22  1.00             
MB  0.07  0.05  1.00           
DIVNI  0.02  -0.01  0.17  1.00         
TANTA  0.08  0.08  -0.04  -0.16  1.00       
LNS  0.21  -0.06  0.19  0.24  -0.11  1.00     
SDOE  0.00  -0.08  -0.09  -0.16  0.03  -0.17  1.00   
EBITTA  0.03  0.40  0.18  0.10  -0.08  0.13  -0.19    1.00  
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Table 6 
Regression Tests of the Impact of Tax Regimes on Firm Leverage: Parsimonious 
Models 
 
This table presents tests of the impact of the tax regime on firm leverage using two parsimonious models: (1) Leverage 
= 0 + 1 DTAX +  and (2) Leverage = 0 + 1 DTAX + 2 LNS +  Six alternate measures of leverage are used with 
debt always measured in book value terms: STDBV= short term debt divided by book value of equity, LTDBV= long 
term debt divided by book value of equity, TDBV= total debt divided by book value of equity, STDMV= short term debt 
divided by market value of equity, LTDMV= long term debt divided by market value of equity, and TDMV= total debt 
dividend by market value of equity. DTAX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in a country with corporate 
taxes; otherwise it is equal to 0.  LNS is the natural log of sales used as a proxy for firm size. The regression estimates 
are based on the heteroscedastic Tobit estimation procedure. The first column identifies the dependent variable used, 
the second column (and third column in Panel B) presents the coefficient estimates for the explanatory variable(s) along 
with the chi-square statistic for the significance of the coefficient in parentheses, and the last column to the right 
contains the Log Likelihood ratio and number of observations used in the model estimation.  Panel A (Panel B) present 
estimates for equation 1 (2).  ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * 
denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Leverage = 0 + 1 DTAX+ 
Model  DTAX  Log Likelihood 
N 
























Panel B: Leverage = 0 + 1 DTAX + 2 LNS +  
Model                   DTAX                LNS  Log Likelihood 
N 
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Table 7 
Regression Test of the Impact of Tax Regimes on Firm Leverage: Full Model 
 
This table presents the impact of tax regime on firm leverage using the following regression model: 
Leverage = 0 + 1 DTAX + 2 NDTS + 3 MB + 4 DIVNI + 5 TANTA + 6 LNS + 7 SDOE + 8 EBITTA + .  Six alternate measures 
of leverage are used with debt always measured in book value terms: STDBV= short term debt divided by book value of equity, LTDBV= 
long term debt divided by book value of equity, TDBV= total debt divided by book value of equity, STDMV= short term debt divided by 
market value of equity, LTDMV= long term debt divided by market value of equity, and TDMV= total debt divided by market value of 
equity. The explanatory variables are: DTAX=dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is in a taxed Arab country, 0 otherwise; NDTS=non debt 
tax shield defined as sum of depreciation and investment tax credit divided by total assets; MB= market price per share divided by book 
value per share; DIVNI= dividends paid divided by net income; TANTA= tangible assets divided by total assets; LNS=natural log of sales; 
SDOE=standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets; and EBITTA= earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets. The regression estimates are based on the heteroscedastic Tobit estimation procedure. The first column identifies 
the explanatory variable.  The columns labeled 1-6 refer to the 6 regressions using alternate measures of the dependent variable indicated 
below the column number.  For each explanatory variable we show the coefficient estimate along with the chi-square statistic for the 
significance of the coefficient in parentheses.  The last row shows the Log Likelihood ratio for each of the regression models and the 
number of observations used in the model estimation.  ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, 
and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 8 
Regression Test of the Impact of Marginal Tax Rates on Firm Leverage 
 
0 + 1 MTR*DTAX + 
2 NDTS + 3 MB + 4 DIVNI + 5 TANTA + 6 LNS + 7 SDOE + 8 EBITTA   Six alternate measures of leverage are used with 
debt always measured in book value terms: STDBV= short term debt divided by book value of equity, LTDBV= long term debt divided 
by book value of equity, TDBV= total debt divided by book value of equity, STDMV= short term debt divided by market value of equity, 
LTDMV= long term debt divided by market value of equity, and TDMV= total debt divided by market value of equity. The explanatory 
variables are: MTR*DTAX= interaction term of marginal tax rate and a tax dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is in a taxed Arab country, 
0 otherwise.  The marginal tax rate is determined as taxes paid divided by income before taxes.  The interaction terms captures the effect 
of  the  marginal  tax  rate  on  leverage  use  in  Arab  countries  with  corporate  taxes.    NDTS=non-debt  tax  shield  defined  as  sum  of 
depreciation and investment tax credit divided by total assets. MB= market price per share divided by book value per share.  DIVNI= 
dividends paid divided by net income.  TANTA= tangible assets divided by total assets. LNS=natural log of sales.  SDOE=standard 
deviation of earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets.  EBITTA= earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. 
The  regression  estimates  are  based  on  the  heteroscedastic  Tobit  estimation  procedure.  The  first  column  identifies  the  explanatory 
variable.  The columns labeled 1-6 refer to the 6 regressions using alternate measures of the dependent variable indicated below the 
column number.  For each explanatory variable we show the coefficient estimate along with the chi-square statistic for the significance 
of the coefficient in parentheses. The last row shows the Log Likelihood ratio for each of the regression models and the number of 
observations used in the model estimation.  ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * 
denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 9 
Regression Test of the Impact of Non-Debt Tax Shields on Firm Leverage 
 
This table presents the impact of non-debt tax shields on firm leverage using the following regression model: Leverage = 0 + 1 
MTR*DTAX + 2 NDTS*DTAX + 3 NDTS*DNOTAX + 4 MB + 5 DIVNI +6 TANTA + 7 LNS + 8 SDOE + 9 EBITTA+ . Six 
alternate measures of leverage are used with debt always measured in book value terms: STDBV= short term debt divided by book value 
of equity, LTDBV= long term debt divided by book value of equity, TDBV= total debt divided by book value of equity, STDMV= short 
term debt divided by market value of equity, LTDMV= long term debt divided by market value of equity, and TDMV= total debt divided 
by market value of equity. The explanatory variables are: MTR*DTAX= interaction term of marginal tax rate and a tax dummy variable 
equal to 1 if firm is in a taxed Arab country, 0 otherwise.  The marginal tax rate is determined as taxes paid divided by income before 
taxes.    The  interaction  terms  captures the  effect  of  the  marginal  tax  rate on  leverage  use  in Arab  countries  with  corporate taxes.  
NDTS*DTAX = interaction of non-debt tax shield and the tax dummy variable.  NDTS is defined as sum of depreciation and investment 
tax credit divided by total assets. NDTS*DNOTAX = interaction term between NDTS and a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for firms 
operating  in  countries with  no corporate income  tax,  0  otherwise.    The  NDTS  interaction  terms capture  the  differential  effects  of 
depreciation and investment tax credit (sources of non-debt tax shield in taxed economies) on leverage for taxed and non-taxed countries.  
MB= market price per share divided by book value per share.  DIVNI= dividends paid divided by net income.  TANTA= tangible assets 
divided by total assets.  LNS=natural log of sales.  SDOE=standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxed scaled by total assets. 
EBITTA= earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. The regression estimates are based on the heteroscedastic Tobit 
estimation procedure. The first column identifies the explanatory variable.  The columns labeled 1-6 refer to the 6 regressions using 
alternate measures of the dependent variable indicated below the column number.  For each explanatory variable we show the coefficient 
estimate along with the chi-square statistic for the significance of the coefficient in parentheses.  The last row shows the Log Likelihood 
ratio for each of the regression models and the number of observations used in the model estimation.  ***denotes significance at the 1% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
 



























































































































































Regression Test of the Impact of Relative Personal Taxes on Firm Leverage 
 
This table presents the impact of personal taxes on firm leverage using the following regression model: Leverage = 0 + 1 MTR*DTAX 
+2 MB + 3 DIVNI +4 DIVNI*DTAX +5 TANTA + 6 LNS + 7 SDOE +  EBITTA + .  Six alternate measures of leverage are 
used with debt always measured in book value terms: STDBV= short term debt divided by book value of equity, LTDBV= long term debt 
divided by book value of equity, TDBV= total debt divided by book value of equity, STDMV= short term debt divided by market value of 
equity, LTDMV= long term debt divided by market value of equity, and TDMV= total debt divided by market value of equity. The 
explanatory variables are: MTR*DTAX= interaction term of marginal tax rate and a tax dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is in a taxed 
Arab country, 0 otherwise.  The marginal tax rate is determined as taxes paid divided by income before taxes.  The interaction terms 
captures the  effect  of  the  marginal  tax  rate on  leverage  use  in Arab  countries with  corporate taxes.    NDTS  is  defined  as sum  of 
depreciation and investment tax credit divided by total assets. DIVNI= dividends paid divided by net income.  DIVNI*DTAX is the 
interaction of DIVNI and DTAX; it captures the relative preference for dividends over interest due to personal tax differentials in taxable 
Arab countries.  TANTA= tangible assets divided by total assets. LNS=natural log of sales.  SDOE= standard deviation of earnings before 
interest and taxed scaled by total assets. EBITTA= earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. The regression estimates are 
based on the heteroscedastic Tobit estimation procedure. The first column identifies the explanatory variable.  The columns labeled 1-6 
refer to the 6 regressions using alternate measures of the dependent variable indicated below the column number.  For each explanatory 
variable we show the coefficient estimate along with the chi-square statistic for the significance of the coefficient in parentheses.  The 
last row shows the Log Likelihood ratio for each of the regression models and the number of observations used in the model estimation.  
***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
Model  1 
STBV 
2 
LTBV 
3 
TDBV 
4 
STMV 
5 
LTMV 
6 
TDMV 
MTR*DTAX 
 
1.0245*** 
(29.09) 
0.6807** 
(6.57) 
1.0090*** 
(13.50) 
1.2224*** 
(22.31) 
0.8808*** 
(8.68) 
1.3371*** 
(19.41) 
NDTS 
 
1.0138*** 
(13.69) 
0.1962 
(0.32) 
0.5611 
(2.59) 
1.2571*** 
(11.18) 
-0.0306 
(0.01) 
0.2803 
(0.52) 
MB 
 
0.0109 
(0.73) 
0.0384** 
(5.26) 
0.0437** 
(6.61) 
-0.0265 
(2.07) 
-0.0357* 
(3.43) 
-0.0397** 
(4.32) 
DIVNI 
 
0.0579 
(0.99) 
-0.3855*** 
(22.55) 
-0.2888*** 
(13.08) 
0.1309* 
(2.73) 
-0.4399*** 
(23.21) 
-0.2791*** 
(9.92) 
DIVNI*DTAX 
 
-0.0575 
(0.70) 
0.2279** 
(5.95) 
0.0897 
(0.94) 
-0.1148 
(1.49) 
0.2837*** 
(7.32) 
0.0952 
(0.87) 
TANTA 
 
-0.0525 
(0.47) 
0.4182*** 
(17.56) 
0.2976*** 
(8.99) 
-0.0169 
(0.03) 
0.4650*** 
(17.61) 
0.3414*** 
(9.75) 
LNS 
 
0.0546*** 
(30.21) 
0.1305*** 
(99.40) 
0.1236*** 
(94.15) 
0.0564*** 
(18.06) 
0.1043*** 
(52.98) 
0.0995*** 
(49.96) 
SDOE 
 
-0.0495 
(1.05) 
-0.0035 
(0.00) 
-0.0511 
(0.69) 
-0.0879 
(1.78) 
-0.0569 
(0.70) 
-0.1152* 
(2.88) 
EBITTA 
 
-0.7084*** 
(9.08) 
-0.2788 
(2.00) 
-0.4354** 
(4.69) 
-0.9589*** 
(8.64) 
-0.3481 
(2.46) 
-0.5205** 
(5.49) 
Log Likelihood 
N 
-240.7 
562 
-382.1 
550 
-420.3 
551 
-301.9 
559 
-428.1 
550 
-458.2 
545 
 